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Abstract 
 
The impact of diversification on a firm’s performance has been being studied for 
many years. Still there are many questions on what are the specific effects of such 
strategy. Therefore, this dissertation intends to test if diversified firms outperform the 
focused ones and whether the level of diversification affects linearly the firm’s 
performance or if there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm’s 
performance and total the level of diversification. To deepen the reliability of the results, 
there will also be made a distinction between the performance of related and unrelated 
diversifiers. The findings, based on a sample of Portuguese companies suggest that 
diversification affects performance positively, as diversified firms outperform the 
focused ones. The results do also show that unrelated diversifiers exhibit better levels of 
performance than the related ones. Besides that, the results point for a U-shaped 
relationship between a firm’s ROI and its level of diversification. 
 
JEL-codes: G32, G34, L25 
Key-words: corporate diversification; Portugal; performance; relatedness; value 
creation; u-shaped relationship; unrelated diversification; ROI 
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Sumário 
O impacto da diversificação no desempenho financeiro das empresas tem vindo a ser um 
tema bastante estudado, nos últimos anos. No entanto, persistem ainda diversas questões 
em torno de quais serão os efeitos desta estratégia numa empresa. Assim, o intuito desta 
dissertação passa por testar se as empresas diversificadas apresentam um melhor 
desempenho que as empresas especializadas e se o nível de diversificação afeta, de forma 
linear, o desempenho da empresa ou se existe uma relação de U invertido entre o 
desempenho da empresa e o nível de diversificação. Para aprofundar a robustez dos 
resultados, procedeu-se à distinção entre empresas diversificadas relacionadas e não-
relacionadas. Os resultados, baseados numa amostra de empresas portuguesas, sugerem 
que a diversificação influencia positivamente o desempenho financeiro da empresa e que 
as empresas diversificadas chegam mesmo a superar as especializadas. Este estudo aponta 
ainda para o facto de as empresas diversificadas não-relacionadas apresentarem melhores 
níveis de desempenho que as relacionadas. Além disso, os resultados exibem ainda uma 
relação em forma de U entre o Retorno no Investimento das empresas e o índice de 
diversificação total.  
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1. Introduction 
Diversification1 involves a set of processes, that make a single firm take control over 
multiple businesses, that might be, or not, related to the core activity of the main firm. 
This dissertation aims to study the main differences, in terms of performance, between 
diversified and focused companies from Portugal.  
There are many studies for this subject, however there’s still controversy on whether 
diversification contributes for value creation. Some of them show that diversification 
brings some benefits for a company, while others suggest the opposite. Such contributions 
led to mixed results over time and for this reason, the existent literature for corporate 
diversification presents us a puzzle.  
Back in the 1960s/1970s, a high percentage of firms diversified themselves from their 
core businesses, to avoid relying on a single industry. Studies have shown that the 
“relationships established and the levels of profitability varied between firms with 
different strategies of diversification” (Rumelt, 1974). Such events made room for the 
emergence of new studies, that attempted to understand the processes and the motivations 
behind such decisions. However, later, mainly in the 1980s, firms were seen getting back 
to their core businesses. The refocus2 phenomena generated an interesting turning point 
in history.  Even though some empirical studies suggest that diversified firms perform 
worse than the specialized ones (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et 
al., 2000), there is also evidence that diversified firms unveil better levels of performance 
than the undiversified ones (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Graham et al., 2002). 
Recent researches have shown that «market sentiment has swung in favor of diversified 
companies which is reflected in the steady decline of the conglomerate discount3» (BCG, 
                                                        
1 Diversification is a way to expand a company from their core activity, by exploring new markets 
and new products (Ansoff, 1957). 
2 Refocus strategies, happen when a firm goes back to its core activity (Denis et al, 1997). 
 
3 Difference often found between the conglomerate value and the value of its parts. It’s used as a 
sign of value destruction, which may be associated with the misallocation of the resources (Lang 
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2012), which worked as one of the motives to enroll in this topic. The other reasons are 
related with the fact that management and marketing disciplines usually support 
diversification, opposing financial scholars, whose perceptions typically contrast with the 
first ones, pointing to problems that arise under the agency and the internal capital market 
perspectives (Fama, 1980; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Denis et al., 1997; Pandya and Rao, 
1998). Despite that, most of the studies already conducted are centralized in the US, UK 
and some European countries.  
The theoretical background is also somehow controversial, considering that the theories 
involved provide elucidations for parts of the process, and so they fail to fully unveil the 
motives behind the decision to diversify. 
Moreover, the Portuguese market has been barely studied, so it would be interesting to 
study it, in the sense that it could turn out to bring valuable insights for this topic. 
Most of the studies haven’t dug in about the explanatory variables for performance, which 
may be the reason why the results obtained are at some point biased. Despite that and as 
far as we know, this topic hasn’t been addressed yet, at least at this extent, in Portugal, 
which may provide us with newer perceptions regarding the role of diversification in 
Portugal and so it may allow us to contribute to bridge the gap among this issue.  
Considering the objectives mentioned, we are looking forward to answering the following 
questions: 
• What’s the level of diversification of Portuguese firms? From the diversified ones, 
which firms are related4 or unrelated diversifiers? 
• Which variables can explain the operational performance (ROI)? 
• What can we infer about focused and diversified firms’ performance? 
                                                        
and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Rajan et al, 2000; Santalo and 
Becerra, 2008). 
4 Relatedness is the linkage between new businesses, resultant form diversification, and the core 
business of the firm. If the new ones are associated with the main one, the firm is a related 
diversifier, otherwise it is an unrelated diversifier (Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981; Berger and Ofek, 
1995). 
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In this study, the level of diversification will be computed through an index for total 
diversification, which results of the sum of the entropy indexes5 (based on SIC measures) 
for the level of relatedness and unrelatedness. Finally, the sample will be composed of 
Portuguese companies that will be analyzed between 2006 and 2015. 
The results show that for the total sample (including both focused and diversified firms), 
diversification has a positive impact on a firm’s performance. Among the diversified 
firms, unrelated diversifiers unveil better levels of performance and that the effect of 
diversification on performance is different for each sector.  
Following this introduction, a literature review will be carried on (in Chapter 2) and in 
Chapter 3, the hypotheses will be formulated. Then, methodology and the methods used 
are presented in Chapter 4. On Chapter 5 it’s explained how the sample was collected, it 
also comprises a characterization of the sample, the research design and the descriptive 
statistics. Finally, results are shown on Chapter 6 and the last part of this dissertation has 
the main conclusions, limitations and further research suggestions (Chapter 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 The entropy measure is used to compute the total diversification. In simple terms, it’s a weighted 
average of the firm’s diversification within sectors, plus the firm’s diversification across sectors 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). 
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2. Literature Review 
In this section, we will address the main concepts developed, the theoretical background 
(vast and at some point contradictory) and the most relevant perspectives and conclusions 
obtained.  
Considering the previous research in this topic, the first conclusion is that the relationship 
between a firm’s performance and diversification is not fully explained, creating a sort of 
a “puzzle”.  
2.1. Historical facts 
Back in the 1960s/1970s, a high percentage of firms diversified to avoid relying on a 
single industry. Studies have shown that the “relationships established and the levels of 
profitability varied between firms with different strategies of diversification” (Rumelt, 
1974). 
Diversified firms see their specific risk reduced, considering that it is spread across 
industries, which may have positive repercussions on their long-term compensations 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Later, mainly in the 1980s, firms were getting back to their 
core businesses. The refocus phenomena generated an interesting turning point in history. 
Evidence has shown that firms don’t voluntarily refocus, it’s yet caused by the external 
monitoring of managers (Denis et al., 1997). 
Most of the existent literature suggests that diversification destroys value (Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et al., 2000). The conglomerate discount might be 
associated with inefficient capital markets, Stulz (1990), or with influence costs, that 
result from internal power struggles (Rajan et al., 2000). However, the overall literature 
shows conflicting results and interpretations (Markides and Williamson, 1994). An 
example of that arises with further studies which have shown that diversified companies 
trade at a discount before they become diversified. Thus, when they control for self-
selection, the discount is lowered or it becomes a premium (Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
The first categorical measures for this strategy have distinguished three levels of 
diversification: undiversified firms; moderately diversified firms and highly diversified 
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firms. These studies have also found that the influence of diversification on a firm’s 
performance depends on the type and level of relatedness among the company’s 
businesses (Rumelt, 1974; 1982). Even though there is lack of evidence on what would 
be the best type of diversification, related diversified firms tend to show better results 
than unrelated or conglomerate diversification (Bettis, 1981; Markides and Williamson, 
1994). 
Empirical studies suggest that diversified firms perform worse than the specialized ones 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the 
impact of diversification varies across firms. The discounts (worst performance) tend to 
happen in industries where most of the competitors are specialized and the premium 
(better performance) arises when there are only a few specialized competitors in the sector 
(Santalo and Becerra, 2008). 
Contrarily to that and in accordance with the lack of consensus among the authors, there 
is also evidence for the fact that diversified firms unveil better levels of performance than 
the undiversified ones (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Graham et al., 2002). 
2.2. Why diversify?   
The decision to diversify can be supported by four perspectives/ views, namely the 
transaction costs economics perspective, the market power perspective, the resource 
perspective, which are related with profit maximization and the agency perspective, 
which is of managerial nature.  
2.2.1.  Transaction Costs Perspective 
The initial studies of the firm and market organization, introduced the concept of 
transaction costs, by suggesting that employment relations were more prone to engage in 
transaction costs, if contracted outside a company (Coase, 1937). 
To mitigate transaction costs, firms can develop internal strategies, by taking advantage 
of the knowledge and expertise they acquire from diversifying (Hitt et al., 1997; Benito-
Osorio et al., 2012). 
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There are multiple explanations to justify the decision to diversify. For instance, one of 
the studies regarding the features of firms rent-generating resources, shows that those 
resources are traded through market processes, which involve high contractual risks, 
namely license loyalties, secrecy and learning curve advantage problem. This way, 
engaging in a diversification strategy would be a smarter decision, to outline the risks  
inherent to any alternative strategy (Silverman, 1999). 
However, this theory has been proven to be insufficient to explain the diversification 
process. Evidence shows that the costs of managing different businesses surpass the 
benefits of sharing capabilities. Therefore, transaction costs lead to a downward 
momentum in the profits of a firm (Williamson, 1975; 1985). 
2.2.2. Market Power Perspective 
The primary studies on diversification, were based on the belief that there’s a positive 
relation between diversification and performance. Therefore, diversification was likely to 
bring market power, considering that it would consist of the sum of the market power on 
individual markets (Hill, 1985). 
A diversified firm is more prone to make a better use of their capabilities than a 
specialized one, since the benefits brought by sharing capabilities promote the growth of 
the market power. It turns out to be a source of efficiency, Scharfstein and Stein (2000), 
considering that the access to external funds is facilitated for diversified firms, promoting 
their financial growth and the process of reallocating capital throughout the multiple 
businesses (Meyer et al., 1992). 
However, authors are not in accordance on how market power can be influenced by 
diversification. Diversification makes it difficult to enter the market for certain 
competitors, which reduces them considerably and helps firms to get market power (Li, 
2007). 
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Evidence turned out to show the opposite. The fact that diversification exhibits a positive 
association with corporate performance is more related to economies of scope6, rather 
than market power (Caves, 1981; Montgomery, 1985). 
2.2.3. Agency Perspective 
Whenever managers benefit more than investors, the agency problem arises (Fama, 
1980), along with the moral hazard problem (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
To handle this problem, managers opt to diversify, so they can solve the emergent 
problems regarding managerial motivations and governance’s efficiency (Li, 2007). 
Therefore, they are more keen to diversify when their interests fail to match the capital 
owners’ ones or when they’re in the presence of information asymmetries (Aron, 1988).  
Managers’ decision to diversify and their unwillingness to refocus are influenced by 
agency problems. Therefore, most of the refocus events happen when firms are exposed 
to external pressures (Denis et al., 1997; Berger and Ofek, 1999). 
Diversification may benefit managers, considering the power and status they get, when 
they’re managing larger companies (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
Additionally, diversification attenuates the moral hazard7 problem with managers, by 
lowering the risk to which they are exposed for incentive purposes, and so it helps 
reducing the agency costs (Aron, 1988). However, agency problems caused by 
managerial motives are the reason why firms maintain low levels of diversification (Denis 
et al., 1997). The conflicts of interest are, hence, reduced mainly due to refocus events 
(Berger and Ofek, 1999). 
 
                                                        
6 Economies of scope describe the fact that the average total cost of production is reduced, when 
the production of goods and/or services increases (Panzar and Willig,1981). 
7  Agency and moral hazards are also highly addressed, when attempting to explain the decision 
and the process of diversification. These problems are likely to arise when managers benefit more 
with diversification than the investors (Fama, 1980; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 2003). 
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2.2.4. Resource Perspective 
A firm is a result of the combination of specific and hardly imitable resources and 
capabilities. Diversification studies show how a firm can efficiently explore their 
resources for its behalf, to create competitive advantage over their peers (Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt, 1988). 
Managers decide to diversify when there’s excess capacity in productive factors or 
resources, and they do so by entering markets where the resource requirements are equal 
to their capabilities (Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Silverman, 1999). 
Diversification allows firms to exchange non-marketable resources. It helps firms to take 
advantage of economies of scope and scale of the resources available, which can be traded 
in different business segments (Kay, 1984). 
This perspective gives an insight on why a firm decides to expand, by diversifying into 
certain segments of business (Li, 2007). The resource view is the most auspicious one, 
since diversification allows firms to exploit their excess capacity in resources. The level 
of profit and extent of diversification are therefore dependent on the resource stock 
(Montgomery, 1994). 
A deep analysis of each one of these four perspectives, indicates that there are several 
limitations and it becomes difficult to select which one provides the best contribution for 
solving the diversification puzzle. Hence, they fail to fully unveil the motives behind the 
decision to diversify, considering they only provide elucidations for parts of the process.  
Further investigation in this field has explored this problem, through re-building the 
existing framework and bringing new evidence regarding the factors that influence the 
decision to diversify. 
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2.3. Empirical Studies8  
Jacquemin and Berry (1979) aimed to test the reliability of the existing measures for 
diversification level, and it showed that entropy measures are the most suitable ones at 
different levels of product and industry aggregation. 
Bettis (1981) studied the performance differences between related and unrelated 
diversified firms. It concluded that related diversifiers tend to perform better. Therefore, 
higher levels of diversification don’t affect performance negatively.  
On the other hand, Berger and Ofek (1995) suggest that diversification destroys value. 
However, such loss can be minimized through related diversification. Additionally, the 
results show that diversification can bring some benefits associated with increased debt 
capacity and tax savings. 
Other studies are focused on understanding the concept and the causes of diversification 
discount, suggesting that managers engage into diversification due to external causes. 
Contrarily to the previous study, Campa and Kedia (2002) show evidence that 
diversification creates value, which contributes to show how contradictory are the results 
among different authors. 
Regarding the motivations for diversifying, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) results show 
that such decision is based on changes at the private benefits level, instead of a way to 
reduce the exposure to risk. 
Santalo and Becerra (2008) attempted to understand the performance of diversified and 
specialized firms and found out that the effect of diversification varies across industries 
and that the diversification discount arises in industries with multiple specialized 
companies. Their results also suggest that diversified firms perform better in industries 
dominated by conglomerates. 
More recently, Custódio (2014) focused on the fact that q-based measures of 
diversification discount are biased. Therefore, measured q is lower for the merged firm, 
                                                        
8 The studies chosen for this chapter represent the ones that served as a foundation for this study 
and are summarized in Appendix 1. 
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and so conglomerates are also lower. The main finding of this study was that the discount 
can be attenuated if the goodwill is subtracted from the book value of assets. However, 
alternative measures, such as market-to-sales aren’t biased. 
 
2.4. Summary  
As shown, the literature for this topic is extensive and the results achieved by different 
authors don’t necessarily coincide, and so the puzzle is not solved yet. Even though the 
seemingly unavoidable loss that comes from diversification is consistent with most 
researches, there is also evidence that such discount may have been due to other external 
causes.  Considering that most of the studies regarding this topic are conducted in the 
United States, United Kingdom and some European countries, our study will use a sample 
of Portuguese companies. Although similar studies have already been done using a 
sample of Portuguese companies, none of them has explored the different impact of 
related and unrelated diversification. 
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3. Hypotheses Formulation  
As stated in the previous chapters, measuring the impact of diversification on a firm’s 
performance can be somehow challenging, considering the lack of consensus brought by 
the literature over time. However, we are intending to test and understand if they 
contribute, or not, to explain the performance of a firm.  
Thus, we defined our research hypotheses as follows:  
• H1: Diversified firms perform better than the non-diversified ones. 
Consistent with the major part of the literature, we are aiming to test if product 
diversification does effectively bring better levels of performance for a firm, than focused 
firms.  
• H2: Diversification creates value, and after a break-point destroys it. (Inverted 
U-shaped relationship) 
To formulate our second hypothesis, we based our assumptions on the fact that there’s an 
optimal level of diversification. At that point, the levels of profitability are likely to be at 
its best (Markides, 1995). Such inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification 
and performance, as shown in Figure 1, has been addressed in the literature for many 
times, even though the results aren’t conclusive (Haans et al., 2016). To test this 
hypothesis, it will be added to the econometric model, presented later, a quadratic term 
for total diversification. 
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• H3: Related diversification affects performance more positively than unrelated 
diversification. 
Regarding our third hypothesis, and according to other studies, a firm that diversifies into 
a new business that isn’t related with the firm’s core business is more likely to perform 
poorly (Rumelt, 1974). In contrast, related diversifiers seem to be the most successful 
ones, considering that the firm will be able to use the benefits of being related with other 
businesses for its behalf (Seth, 1990; Gálvan et al., 2014). Thus, the synergies created 
among related businesses lead us to believe that related diversification provides better 
results, in terms of performance, than focused firms or unrelated diversifiers  (Bettis, 
1981). Relatedness also contributes for reducing business risk (Gálvan et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
Figure 1 – Inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and diversification 
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4. Methodological Aspects 
This chapter aims to present the sources of data and the methodology that will be 
implemented to test the performance levels of diversified and specialized firms.  
4.1. Methodology9 
Consistent with the steps followed by other studies, we will start by measuring the total 
diversification of each firm, using an entropy index. The index incorporates the number 
of segments in which the firm operates, as well as the share of sales verified in each 
segment, providing the level of diversification across the 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)10 industries  (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Hitt et al., 1997; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010; Kistruck et al., 2013). 
SIC codes are implemented to divide the firm’s segments and groups. Therefore, 2-digit 
level SIC industries regard the industry groups and the 4-digit level SIC ones are the 
industry segments (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985; Akpinar and Yigit, 2016).  
The total entropy index DT, is a result of the sum of the related and unrelated parts 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Robins and Wiersema, 2003; Akpinar and Yigit, 2016).  
Therefore, we have that: 
 
 𝑫𝑻 = 𝑫𝑹 + 𝑫𝑼 (1) 
 
Where: 
DT – Total diversification 
DR -  Related diversification 
DU – Unrelated Diversification 
 
                                                        
9 The foundations for the methodology adopted in this dissertation are described in Appendix 2. 
10 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is a system used for classifying industries, which 
was established in the United States. 
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The related diversification entropy index (DR) is used to compute the degree of 
relatedness among the different segments in which the firm develops its activity. This 
way, an industry group is composed by a set of related segments. Accordingly, the 
segments across groups aren’t likely to be related to each other, contrarily to what happens 
with segments within the same industry group (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Montgomery 
and Hariharan, 1991; Akpinar and Yigit, 2016). 
 
Measure of Relatedness: 
 
 
𝑫𝑹𝑱 = ∑ 𝑷𝒊
𝒋
𝐥 𝐧 (
𝟏
𝑷𝒊
𝒋)
𝑴
𝒊&𝒋
 (2) 
 
 
Where: 
DR – Related diversification 
𝑷𝒋
𝒊 - Share of the segment i for group and j in the total sales of the group. 
 
If N represents the segments (4-digit SIC codes) of the firm organized into M industry 
groups (2-digit SIC codes), N ≥M. 
 
Similarly, the unrelated diversification entropy index (DU) is measured using 2-digit SIC 
data, as follows (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Akpinar 
and Yigit, 2016). 
 
 
 
𝑫𝑼 =  ∑ 𝑷𝒋
𝑴
𝒋=𝟏
𝐥𝐧 (
𝟏
𝑷𝒋
) (3) 
 
Where: 
DU – Unrelated diversification 
Pj – Share of sales in 2-digit SIC code j, for a firm with M different 2-digit SIC segments 
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To test if there are differences in terms of performance among diversified and specialized 
firms, the following panel data model will be estimated: 
𝑹𝑶𝑰 = ∝  + (𝜷𝟏 + 𝜽𝟏𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝑫𝑼𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟐𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝑫𝑹)𝑫𝑻 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑽 + 𝜷𝟑𝑮𝑹𝑶 +
𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑰𝒁 + 𝜷𝟓𝑻𝑨𝑿 + 𝜷𝟔𝑻𝑨𝑵 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑰𝑸 + 𝜷𝟖𝑵𝑫𝑻𝑺 + 𝜷𝟗𝑰𝑵𝑽 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑨𝑮𝑬 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑹𝑰𝑺 +
𝜺  
     (4) 
- ROI (Return on Investment) is the dependent variable11, which is a proxy for the 
performance of a firm. 
 
 
𝑹𝑶𝑰12 =
(𝑮𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔)
(𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕)
 (5) 
This measure is seen as the most important financial ratio in financial statement analysis 
(Masa’deh et al., 2015). Additionally, ROI also captures the return on firms’ annual 
invested capital into diversification activities, Santarelli and Tran (2013), which is 
important to our analysis.  
The sales of diversified firms often come from different sources, considering that firms 
usually diversify into new business sectors, so they can attenuate the loss or reducing 
profit in their current industries. However, it’s essential to emphasize that a lower Return 
on Sales (ROS) doesn’t indicate that diversification activities destroy value.  Hence, the 
implementation of ROI allows for seizing the return on firms’ annual invested capital in 
diversification activities. It provides a direct measure for the performance of the 
diversification investment, since it ignores the potential effects of other revenue sources 
(Santarelli and Tran, 2013). 
                                                        
11 A table with a summary of the variables selected and their respective expected signs is presented 
in Appendix 3. 
12 Gains from Investment were considered as being the total sales minus the operational costs, 
over the cost of investment which is the sum of equity and non-current liabilities. 
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- DTit represents the index for total diversification of the firm, which is a result of the sum 
of the entropy indexes for related (DR) and unrelated diversifiers (DU). We considered a 
firm as being diversified when its total diversification index was greater than zero. 
Otherwise, if DT is zero, the firm is focused. 
- Dummy_DUit is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for the case of unrelated 
diversification and zero otherwise (related diversification). The interactivity of the 
dummy (categorical variable) with the variable DT, allows us to convert the dummy into 
a numeric variable, which is better for estimation purposes. This way, we will be able to 
distinguish the effect of related diversifiers from the unrelated ones, in terms of 
performance. The coefficient of the variable DT, which stands for the total entropy index 
of diversification, will be equal to (β1 + θ2), when in the presence of relatedness, since 
Dummy_DUit is going to be zero. Similarly, if there’s unrelatedness, DUit  will be equal 
to one, Dummy_DRit will be zero and the coefficient for DT will be equal to (β1 + θ1) 
(Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Considering that inferring about the effect of related and 
unrelated diversifiers on a firm’s performance is one of the aims of this study, we will 
also implement in our model a dummy variable for relatedness, as shown below.  To 
distinguish between related and unrelated diversifiers, we assumed that related 
diversifiers were the ones with a related diversification index greater than 0.5 (DR>0.5) 
and unrelated diversifiers were the ones with DU>0.5.  
- Dummy_DRit is a dummy variable for related diversifiers. It follows the same 
assumptions as Dummy_DU. The dummy is zero when the firm is focused or an unrelated 
diversifier and it’s one for related diversifiers. This way, in a sample composed by 
diversified and focused firms, after running the regression, we can infer about the way 
each type of firm performs according to the coefficients.  
To separate the relationship between product diversification and firm performance, it’s 
also necessary to control for other variables that also have an effect in the profitability of 
a firm, and those are part of the explanatory variables.  
- LEVERAGE was computed as Debt/ Total Assets, which according to the financial 
literature has an accentuated effect on the value of the firm. Findings suggest that firms 
with high levels of debt tend to lose their market share to their peers (Opler and Titman, 
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1994). The higher the leverage in the firm’s financial structure, the more unpredictable 
will be the earnings and the bigger will be the exposure to risk of owners and creditors 
(Santarelli and Tran, 2013). 
- GROWTH_OPPORTUNITIES were considered as the percentage change in assets 
between the current year and the preceding year. This measure gives an insight regarding 
how open a firm is to new markets, or to expand in existing markets (Li, 2007). 
- SIZE was measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets, which is a proxy usually 
used for competitive position and firms’ advantage (Johnson, 1997). Hence, we 
considered the natural logarithm of total assets, considering that size is highly skewed 
and extreme values tend to affect correlations with other variables (Santarelli and Tran, 
2013). 
- TAXES were considered as the ratio between the current year’s tax and the earnings 
before tax. This is an important variable to incorporate in our model, since corporate 
taxation can influence the activity of the firm, along with the decision-making process. 
However, most studies show that there’s a positive relationship between taxes and 
corporate performance (Mackiemason, 1990). 
- TANGIBILITY was obtained through the ratio of fixed assets over total assets. In line 
with the literature, a firm that owns a significant amount of tangible assets is not prone to 
face financial constraints (Muritala, 2012). Therefore, tangibility is expected to positively 
influence the performance of a firm. 
- LIQUIDITY is measured through the quick assets ratio, and it helps to capture the firm-
specific features, considering that the ability of managing working capital and getting 
higher cash balances relative to current liabilities, are an indicator of greater skills, which 
translates into the ability of a firm to produce higher profits (Majumdar, 1997). 
- Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) represent substitutes for tax benefits of debt financing. 
According to most of the studies, NDTS are expected to have a negative effect on a firm’s 
performance. However, there’s evidence showing that NDTS are not relevant for 
determining a firm’s performance (Shah & Khan, 2007). 
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- INVESTMENT corresponds to the ratio between the sum of net fixed assets and the 
book depreciation expense, over total assets. The previous results for the effect of 
investment on a firm’s performance are controversial. Nevertheless, we are looking for a 
positive relationship between ROI and Investment. 
- AGE is measured according to the years a firm has been operating. This variable can be 
divided into two components, which are the productivity and the profitability. An older 
firm will tend to be more productive, however it will be less profitable. Nevertheless, and 
in the context of this study, we will focus on the profitability component. 
- RISK is computed as the ratio between EBIT (Earnings Before Interests and Taxes) and 
EAIT (Earnings After Interests and Taxes). Firms with highly volatile earnings are likely 
to face situations where cash flows are insufficient for the debt service (Johnson, 1997). 
However, engaging in higher levels of risk may be beneficial for the company, and so a 
positive sign between performance and risk is expected (Mohammed and Knapkova, 
2016). 
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5. Sample Selection and Descriptive statistics 
5.1. Sample Selection 
To select a sample of panel firm-level data from 2006 to 2015, we picked a random 
sample of 300 firms, among the 1000 top performers firms in Portugal, in 2015. From 
that sample, we proceeded to choose only the Portuguese firms and ended up with a 
sample of 178 firms. From those, we excluded all the financial firms and selected only 
the 80 firms that have their accounting information available. Therefore, our sample was 
composed of 80 firms with headquarters in Portugal, as shown in Appendix 6. 
The accounting data was collected from Sabi database and from the annual reports of the 
firms. 
5.1.1. Characterization of the sample 
In Table 1, there’s a representation of the sectors used on our sample, based on the 2-digit 
SIC code system. 
Sector Firms 
1. Construction 7 
2. Electric 1 
3. Communications 2 
4. Manufacturing 32 
5. Retail Trade 7 
6. Sanitary service 1 
7. Services 8 
8. Transportation 7 
9. Wholesale Trade 15 
Total no. of firms 80 
Table 1 – Sectors that compose the sample 
As it can be seen in Table 2, most of our sample is composed by focused firms (69%) and 
the remaining firms are diversified, where the related diversifiers are in minority (just 9% 
of the sample). 
 
  Diversified 
Focused Total 
DU DR 
Companies 18 7 55 80 
Table 2 – Types of firms 
 20 
 
5.2. Descriptive statistics13  
This is the simplest way to analyze data and to infer about the potential patterns, features 
and distribution of each one of the variables, as shown in Table 7. 
To test if the difference between the means of the two types of firms (Table 3) is equal to 
zero (null hypothesis), we performed a t-test for equality of means, which is shown in 
Table 3. The p-value provided by the test, leads us to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
we can infer that the difference is different from zero, this is, the mean of ROI for focused 
firms is different from the mean of diversified firms.  
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
 t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
 Lower Upper 
ROI 
Equal 
means 
assumed 
 
6.755 798.000 0.000 1.347 0.199 0.956 1.739 
Equal 
means 
not 
assumed 
 
6.518 442.754 0.000 1.347 0.207 0.941 1.753 
Table 3 – t-test for Equality of Means 
Then we also made a comparison of the medians of ROI for both focused and diversified 
firms. To test the equality of medians, we performed a Mann-Whitney Test for the 
medians of ROI for both focused and diversified firms, presented in Table 4. Thus, with 
a significance level of 5%, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the medians 
are not the same across the two types of firm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Appendix 4 provides a matrix with the Pearson Correlation of the overall variables. 
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Hypothesis Test Summary 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. 
The medians of ROI are the same 
across categories of Type of firm. 
Independent-Samples 
Mann-Whitney Test 
0.000 
Table 4 - Mann-Whitney Test for median comparison14 
The same procedures were made, for related and unrelated diversified firms. In Table 5, 
the t-test for Equality of Means’ p-value suggests that the means are equal across 
unrelated and related diversified firms. 
Independent Samples Test 
 
 t-test for Equality of Means 
 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval  
 Lower Upper 
ROI 
Equal 
means 
assumed 
 
.191 248 .849 .075 .393 -.700 .850 
Equal 
means 
not 
assumed 
 
.289 223 .773 .075 .260 -.437 .587 
Table 5 - t-test for Equality of Means (related and unrelated diversified firms) 
To test the equality of medians, we performed the Mann-Whitney test, shown in Table 6. 
Thus, with a significance level of 5%, the p-value provided by the test suggests rejecting 
the hypothesis of equality of medians. Therefore, the medians of ROI vary across related 
and unrelated diversified firms. 
 
Hypothesis Test Summary 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. 
The medians of ROI are the same 
across categories of Type of firm. 
Independent-Samples 
Mann-Whitney Test 
0.001 
Table 6 - Mann-Whitney Test for median comparison (related and unrelated diversified firms)15 
                                                        
14 Asymptotic significances are displayed. Asymptotic Sig. (2-tailed). Significance level: 5%. 
15 Asymptotic significances are displayed. Asymptotic Sig. (2-tailed). Significance level: 5%. 
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Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max
ROI 0.71 0.33 2.61 -43.14 19.34 1.14 0.62 2.48 -3.34 19.34 -0.23 -0.01 3.11 -43.14 1.61 -0.17 -0.38 0.76 -3.04 2.12
DT 0.28 0.00 0.52 0.00 2.21 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.38 0.90 0.94 0.60 0.00 2.21 0.81 0.86 0.46 0.00 1.58
Leverage 0.71 0.69 0.56 0.02 14.87 0.70 0.67 0.33 0.02 3.29 0.69 0.69 0.19 0.13 1.55 0.88 0.72 1.62 0.07 14.87
Size 18.56 18.37 1.86 12.74 24.48 17.68 17.59 1.24 12.74 21.60 20.42 20.19 1.25 17.81 23.36 20.64 20.19 2.04 17.09 24.48
Tangibility 0.46 0.43 0.31 0.00 6.06 0.40 0.35 0.33 0.00 6.06 0.57 0.57 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.68 0.21 0.00 1.00
Liquidity 1.38 1.21 0.80 0.08 7.90 1.51 1.34 0.78 0.09 6.32 1.17 1.02 0.83 0.08 7.90 0.87 0.78 0.45 0.12 3.37
NDTS -0.04 -0.03 0.08 -2.07 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.41 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.23 -2.07 0.05
Growth 0.14 0.03 0.93 -0.94 20.97 0.16 0.03 1.07 -0.94 20.97 0.08 0.01 0.50 -0.94 5.09 0.17 0.03 0.51 -0.35 2.76
Age 36.05 29.00 23.84 0.00 97.00 37.87 32.00 22.98 2.00 97.00 32.44 22.00 25.23 0.00 96.00 31.00 22.00 25.31 7.00 95.00
TAX 0.06 0.11 1.31 -18.51 19.50 0.17 0.16 1.25 -18.51 19.50 -0.15 -0.06 1.42 -12.24 6.48 -0.29 -0.21 1.36 -7.19 7.43
Investment 0.74 0.72 1.50 -0.50 43.70 0.67 0.69 0.41 -0.50 5.60 0.95 0.75 3.06 0.07 43.70 0.79 0.79 0.40 0.25 3.42
Total_Risk 1.73 1.02 3.85 -26.74 43.33 1.22 0.86 3.09 -26.74 31.28 2.80 1.49 4.71 -4.08 36.66 2.93 2.31 5.60 -9.30 43.33
Focused Unrelated Related 
70 Obs.800 Obs. 550 Obs. 170 Obs.
Total
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Main Model 
6.1.1. Model for total diversification effect 
In Table 8, the total sample was divided into three sub-samples, for focused firms and 
diversified firms, both related and unrelated.  
Regarding our first hypothesis, the results partially suggest that total diversification 
explains the performance of a firm on the total sample, confirming the results obtained 
by Pandya and Rao (1998); Palich et al. (2000); Santalo and Becerra (2004) and on the 
related and unrelated diversifiers’ samples. However, the coefficient for Total 
Diversification is only statistically significant for the unrelated diversifiers’ sample. 
The samples for the related and unrelated diversifiers show a strong R-squared, which 
suggests that these models have a high predictive power. Even on the total sample, when 
analyzing the interactive variables, we can infer that unrelated diversified firms 
outperform the related ones. However, the coefficients associated with those variables are 
not statistically significant. The unrelated diversifiers’ sample show more statistically 
significant coefficients than the related sample’s ones. This finding is consistent with 
other similar studies in this field, which also found that unrelated diversified firms show 
better operating performance (Michel and Shaked, 1984; Rocca and Staglianò, 2012; 
Nyaingiri and Ogollah, 2015). 
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Table 8 – Regression Analysis for the linear terms 
Explanatory vars Total Focused Related Unrelated 
DT 0.278  -0.009 0.193*** 
(dummy_DU)*DT 0.173    
(dummy_DR)*DT -0.196    
Investment -1.034*** -0.930*** -1.059*** -1.012*** 
Total_Risk -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.007** 
Tax 0.015*** 0.015 0.023 0.008 
Age 0.007 0.019* 0.022*** 0 
Growth -0.036 -0.026 0.068 -0.015 
NDTS -0.173 -7.272*** 0.161 0.248 
Liquidity 0.068 0.095* -0.067 -0.066*** 
Tangibility 0.161 -0.326* 0.415* -0.432*** 
Size -0.395*** -0.357*** -0.015 -0.129** 
Leverage -0.037 0.016 -0.006 0.012 
Intercept 8.36 7.084 0.088 3.566 
R-sq 0.491 0.29 0.859 0.998 
 overall within overall within 
Observations 800 550 70 180 
Period 2006-2015 
Method 
RE 
robust 
FE 
Robust 
RE FE 
ANOVA16 0 0 0 0 
Robust Hausman P-value= 0.08 P-value= 0.00 P-value=1 P-value = 0.00 
BP-Koenker P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00 P-value=0.50 P-value=0.47 
Shapiro-Wilk17 P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00 P-value=0.00 
Dependent Variable: ROI. *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level; ** Significant at 10% and 5% level;  
* Significant at 10% level. RE – Random Effects Model; FE – Fixed Effects Model18 
                                                        
16 ANOVA tables provided p-values of zero, which means the models are significant. 
17 Shapiro Wilk’s test for normality, suggests that the residuals of the four regressions don’t follow 
a normal distribution. 
18 To choose the estimation method, we used a robust version of the Hausman Test, under the null 
hypothesis that Random Effects Model is consistent. (More detail on the estimation method are 
shown in Appendix 5) Using BP-Koenker test, the total panel and the focused panel, are 
heteroscedastic, which is why we used a robust version of Fixed and Random Effects estimators. 
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6.1.2. Curvilinear model 
To test our second hypothesis, we ran our generic model, including a quadratic term for 
the total diversification index, using GMM (Generalized Method of Moments), 
considering that these estimators are known to be consistent, asymptotically normal, and 
efficient.  
Thus, our inference, shown in Table 9, consisted of deriving the model to DT, to find the 
first derivative and conjecture about the monotony of the function. The zero of the 
derivative is equal to 0.354, which is the minimum of our initial function. 
Therefore, our results don’t support the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between diversification and performance, as found by some fields of research. However, 
our findings are consistent with other studies that support the existence of a U-shaped 
relationship between diversification and a firm’s performance. This means that in an 
initial phase, diversification destroys value and so the performance levels are likely to go 
down, until they reach a breakpoint (0.354), from which it will recover and begin to create 
value, after some time (Wan, 1998; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Altaf and Shah, 2015). The 
Figure 2, attempts to represent the relationship between performance and the square of 
total diversification, according to our results. 
 
Figure 2 – Curvilinear Relationship between the square of Total Diversification and Performance. 
 
DT2
Performance
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Table 9 – Regression Analysis for the quadratic term of total diversification 
Dependent Var - ROI  
Explanatory Vars Total 
DT -0.214 
DT2 0.302** 
Investment -0.952*** 
Total_Risk 0.001 
Tax 0.007** 
Age 0.025 
Growth -0.069** 
NDTS 0.024 
Liquidity 0.018 
Tangibility 0.239*** 
Size -0.490*** 
Leverage -0.021 
Intercept 9.503 
Observations 800 
Period 2006-2015 
Method GMM 
Arellano-Bond Test19  
• First order P-value= 0.676 
• Second order P-value=0.221 
*** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level; ** Significant at 10% and 5% level;  
* Significant at 10% level 
6.1.3. Model for relatedness 
To test our third hypothesis, we only used a panel including the related and unrelated 
diversified firms, since we were aiming to study the differences between related and 
unrelated diversifiers in terms of performance. For this purpose, we included the dummy 
variable for unrelated diversifiers (Dummy_DU) and for related diversifiers 
(Dummy_DR).  
                                                        
19 Test for first order and second order correlation, which null hypothesis states that there’s no 
serial correlation. The model containing quadratic terms doesn’t show first-order, nor second-
order serial correlation, considering that the p-values are greater than 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. 
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The results, in Table 10, show that the coefficient for unrelated diversifiers 
(Dummy_DU)*DT is positive and statistically significant, which is not the case for 
related diversifiers (Dummy_DR)*DT, whose coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant. Even though such results make us reject our third hypothesis, those are in line 
with the conclusions achieved by Michel and Shaked (1984); Rocca and Staglianò (2012); 
Nyaingiri and Ogollah (2015). 
 The coefficient for total diversification does also show a positive relationship with a 
firm’s ROI, even though it is not statistically significant.  
Table 10 – Regression Analysis for related and unrelated diversifiers 
Dependent Var - ROI  
Explanatory Vars Rel./Unr. 
DT 0.114 
(Dummy_DU)*DT 0.157** 
(Dummy_DR)*DT -0.239 
Investment -1.015*** 
Total_Risk -0.002 
Tax 0.009 
Age 0.003 
Growth -0.195 
NDTS 0.064 
Liquidity -0.035 
Tangibility -0.177* 
Size -0.171*** 
Leverage -0.031** 
Intercept 4.096 
R-sq 0.996 
Observations 250 
Period 2006-2015 
Method FE 
ANOVA 0 
Robust Hausman P-value= 0.00 
BP-Koenker P-value=0.54 
Shapiro-Wilk P-value=0.00 
*** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level; ** Significant at 10% and 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level. 
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6.2. Industry Results 
To make our results more robust, we also controlled for the industry effect. Table 1 shows 
the sectors that compose our sample. Nevertheless, our firms were grouped in five main 
industries, namely Distribution, Manufacturing, Services, Fuels and Transportation and 
Retail/Wholesale Trade. 
Table 11 shows the results of our general model estimated individually for each 
industry20. 
In the Manufacturing industry, total diversification has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on a firm’s ROI. In the Distribution industry, the impact is also 
positive, but not statistically significant. However, in this industry, related diversifiers 
have a positive and significant impact on a firm’s ROI. In the case of Wholesale/Retail 
Trade and Services industries, diversification has a negative impact on performance, 
although only in the Wholesale/Retail trade industry the coefficient is statistically 
significant. Regarding the Wholesale/Retail Trade industry, there’s also a positive and 
significant relationship between related diversification firms and performance. 
For the Services industry, unrelated diversification (represented by Dummy_DU) has a 
positive and significant impact on a firm’s performance21.  
All the industries show an R-Squared higher than 50%, suggesting the models have a high 
predictive power.  
Analyzing the results per industry, and contrarily to what we have found before, the 
results suggest that related diversified firms outperform the unrelated ones, considering 
that two of the coefficients are significant and for the unrelated ones, there’s only one 
significant coefficient. These results are in line with the findings provided by other studies 
                                                        
20  In the Fuel and Transportation industry sample, the coefficient for the related diversified 
dummy was omitted because we only had one firm that was considered as related diversified on 
that sample. 
21   The Fuel and Transportation industry has very strange results which may be explained by the 
small number of firms on this sub-sample and by the fact that they show an abnormal behavior 
across the years of our sample, mainly during the period of the financial crisis. 
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(Bettis, 1981; Seth, 1990; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Robins and Wiersema, 1995, 
2003; Bryce and Winter, 2009, Gálvan et. al, 2014). 
Total diversification for the Wholesale/Retail Trade and Services industries have a 
negative impact on performance, although only the Wholesale/Retail trade industry’s 
coefficient is significant. The Wholesale/Retail Trade Sector, does also show a positive 
and significant relationship between related diversified firms and performance. 
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Table 11 – Results of the regression per industry 
3
0
 
Dependent variable:ROI. *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level; ** Significant at 10% and 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. Method: RE.
  Distribution Manufacturing 
Wholesale/Retail 
Trade 
Services Fuel and Transportation 
DT 0.18 0.41*** -0.20** -0.09 56.30*** 
(Dummy_DU)*DT -0.09 0.17 0.08 0.61*** 0 
(Dummy_DR)*DT 8.83*** 0.08 0.62*** -0.60 (omitted) 
Leverage -0.08 0.26* 0.36** -0.01 -8.73 
Size -0.12 -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -2.46*** 
Tangibility -1.81*** -0.75*** -0.76*** 0.58** -37.04*** 
Liquidity -0.52*** 0.01 -0.09* 0.40*** -12.38*** 
NDTS -7.26*** -3.53*** -7.75*** 0.11 29.76 
Growth -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.58 
Age 0.01*** 0 0.01*** 0.03** 0.31*** 
Tax 0.39** 0.02 0.04** 0.06** 0.18 
Investment -0.97*** -0.98*** -1.01*** -1.10*** 6.71 
Total_Risk -0.06*** -0.01 0 0 0.08 
Intercept 4.91 5.74 4.61 2.77 65.23 
R-sq 0.54 0.73 0.97 0.70 0.95 
Robust Hausman 1 0.49 0.73 0.10 0.80 
N 210 190 300 50 40 
ANOVA 0 0 0 0 0 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.57 0.01 0 0.03 0.20 
BP-Koenker Test 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.24 0.09 
 
Normality  
      
Histogram      
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7. Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
This dissertation was meant to study the effect of diversification on the performance of 
Portuguese firms, in comparison to the performance of focused ones. For this purpose, 
we started by analyzing the direct effect of total diversification on a firm’s ROI and then 
we proceeded to study the impact on each type of firm separately and, in the end, it was 
made an analysis to the industry effect.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that diversification impacts performance positively, 
which is in accordance with previous studies (Pandya and Rao, 1998; Palich et al., 2000; 
Santalo and Becerra, 2004; Rocca, and Staglianò, 2012). Extending our inference to each 
type of firm, the results suggest that unrelated diversified firms outperform related 
diversified firms and focused firms. This can be justified by the fact that if a firm extends 
its product line and activities to different sectors, the levels of uncertainty and risk are 
likely to be minimized, placing the firm in a more stable place and ensuring the reliability 
of the cash flows (Michel and Shaked, 1984; Rocca and Staglianò, 2012; Nyaingiri and 
Ogollah, 2015). 
We were also able to find that there’s a U-shaped relationship between diversification and 
a firm’s performance, contrarily to what we were expecting. This supports the idea that 
firms that diversify, in an initial phase, will experience a decline on their levels of 
performance. However, as they keep increasing their diversification, they will end up 
hitting a breakpoint, from which the levels of performance will start to improve (Wan, 
1998; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Altaf and Shah, 2015).  
The results for related and unrelated diversified firms show that, controlling for 
relatedness, unrelated diversifiers perform better than related ones, which is consistent 
with previous studies in this field (Michel and Shaked, 1984; Rocca and Staglianò, 2012; 
Nyaingiri and Ogollah, 2015). 
Analyzing the results per industry, it becomes evident that the effect of diversification on 
performance is different in each industry (Santalo and Becerra, 2008). Considering that 
the results are different for each industry, this may suggest that each industry will require 
different strategies for better performance. For instance, the results suggest that related 
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diversified firms show better performance on the Distribution industry, while the 
unrelated diversified firms perform better on the Services industry. 
In general, our results support the idea that the advantages of diversification outweigh its 
disadvantages in Portuguese firms. However, further research on this topic should be 
made, particularly in Portugal, considering that our results were limited by the size of our 
sample, the time horizon and by the fact that we didn’t consider any market variable, 
which would certainly provide interesting results regarding the market performance of 
diversified firms. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Summary of the key studies 
Authors Sample Methods and Control Variables Conclusions 
Jacquemin and Berry 
(1979) 
406 US firms, selected from 1961 and 
1966 editions of Fortune. 1960-1965 
Herfindahl Index and Entropy index of diversification. Main 
Vars. – Projected growth, earnings, % change in Herfindahl and 
Etropy index.  
Evidence supports the implementation of entropy 
measures at different levels of product and 
industry aggregation. 
Bettis (1981) 
80 firms from Fortune 500. Data 
collected from Compustat. 1973-1977 
Regression model using ROA (dependent var.). Control Vars. – 
Advertising, R&D, Plant Investment, Size, Risk, 
Diversification Strategy. 
Related diversified firms show better levels of 
performance. Higher levels of diversification 
don’t reduce ROA. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) 
3,659 firms from Compustat database. 
1986-1991 
 Value loss and relatedness and excess value in diversified 
firms. Control vars. – multi segment indicator, log(sales), 
EBIT/sales, CAPEX/sales, no.of segments, related segments, 
log(assets). 
Diversification leads to value losses, that can be 
minimized with related diversification. It 
provides higher interest tax shields and allows for 
tax savings. 
Campa and Kedia 
(2002) 
8,815 firms from Compustat 
Industry Segment. 1978-1996 
Measure of excess value. Control Variables – log of Total 
Assets, CAPEX/sales, EBIT/sales, Leverage 
External shocks induce firms to diversify. 
Diversification seems to potentiate the creation of 
value in firms. 
Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2003) 
1,602 firms from Compustat 
database. 1993-1998 
Tobin’s Q measures. Control Vars. – Incentives, performance, 
diversification. 
Firm performance is increasing in incentives and 
decreasing in diversification. Diversification is 
positively related to incentives. 
Santalo and Becerra 
(2008) 
778 firms from Compustat database. 
1993-2001 
Firm fixed-effect regressions of the excess value. Control Vars. 
– Diversification, market share of specialized companies, 
log(assets), CAPEX/sales, EBIT/sales. 
The diversification-performance linkage varies 
across industries. 
Custódio (2014) 
3,363 firms from Thomson Financial 
SDC Platinum and Compustat 
database. 1984-2007 
Tobin’s q, Deal Excess Value, and Firm Excess Value. . 
Control Vars. – Diversification, log(assets), CAPEX/sales, 
EBIT/sales. 
Evidence shows that q-measures may provide 
biased results regarding diversification discount. 
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Appendix 2. Studies followed for the methodology implementation 
 
 
Aurhors/ 
Year 
Sample Aim 
Methodology and 
main variables 
Statistical 
Analysis 
Jacquemin 
and Berry 
(1979); 
Palepu 
(1985); Hall 
and John 
(1994). 
 
406 US firms, 
selected from 1961 
and 1966 editions 
of Fortune. 1960-
1965; 
30 firms from 
Standard and Poor's 
Compustat II. 1973-
1979; 
205 firms from 
Standard and Poor's 
Compustat. 1987-
89 
Measure the 
total 
diversification 
of a firm 
Herfindahl Index and 
Entropy index of 
diversification. Main 
Variables – growth, % 
change in Herfindahl 
index. Return on 
sales, net profit after 
taxes, profitability 
growth rate. Return on 
Assets, Return on 
Equity. 
Simple 
Regression, t-
tests, Mann-
Whitney U-test 
Jacquemin 
and Berry 
(1979); 
Montgomerry 
and 
Hariharan 
(1991) 
406 US firms, 
selected from 1961 
and 1966 editions 
of Fortune. 1960-
1965; 366 from 
Standard and Poor's 
Compustat 
Measure the 
level of 
relatedness 
among 
businesses 
SIC based measures; 
concentric measures. 
Simple 
Regression, t-
tests, 
Multivariate 
binomial logit 
models 
Jiang and 
Zhihui 
(2005); 
Bashir et al 
(2013) 
227 listed 
companies from 
Shangai Composite 
Index; 
Measure a 
firm’s 
performance 
Return on Investment.  
Main Variables – 
Scale, diversification, 
relatedness 
Simple 
regression, 
correlation, 
descriptive and 
collinearity 
statistics, 
 
 
 
39 
 
Appendix 3. Dependent/ independent variables and expected signs 
 
Dependent variable ROI (Return on Investment) 
Independent variables Description/ Proxy Expected Sign 
LEV Leverage (Debt/ Total Assets) - 
GRO 
Growth (ΔTotal Assets/ Total 
Assets) 
+ 
SIZ Size (ln(Total Sales)) + 
RIS EBIT/EAIT + 
TAX 
Tax (Current year’s tax/ Earnings 
Before Tax) 
+ 
TAN 
Tangibility (Fixed Assets/ Total 
Assets) 
+ 
LIQ 
Liquidity (Current Assets/ Current 
Liabilities) 
+ 
INV 
Investment (Equity+Short-term 
Debt+Non-current Liabilities)/ 
Total Assets 
+ 
NDTS 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
(Depreciation/Total Assets) 
- 
AGE 
Age of the firm 
(Years of existence) 
+ 
(Dummy_DU)DTit 
(Dummy_DR)DTit 
Product of Dummy for 
unrelatedness(relatedness) and Total 
Diversification  
+ 
DT 
Total Diversification (Entropy 
index) 
+ 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
0
 
 
 
 Lev Size Tang Liq NDTS Gro Age DT TAX ROI Risk Inv 
Leverage Pearson Corr. 1 -.018 .035 -,207** -.006 .002 -,102** ,100** .010 .039 ,168** -.007 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Size Pearson Corr. -.018 1 ,305** -,167** .026 -.035 .055 ,621** -,115** -,314** ,130** .022 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Tangibility Pearson Corr. .035 ,305** 1 -,315** -,179** -.067 .033 ,189** -.058 -,254** .048 ,127** 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Liquidity Pearson Corr. -,207** -,167** -,315** 1 .000 .037 ,130** -,172** .021 -.024 -,090* -.002 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
NDTS Pearson Corr. -.006 .026 -,179** .000 1 .037 .059 .006 .025 .031 .019 -.012 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Growth Pearson Corr. .002 -.035 -.067 .037 .037 1 -.067 -.014 .004 .032 -.037 -.064 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Age Pearson Corr. -,102** .055 .033 ,130** .059 -.067 1 -,108** .020 -.025 -.034 ,088* 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
DT Pearson Corr. ,100** ,621** ,189** -,172** .006 -.014 -,108** 1 -.061 -,259** ,193** ,138** 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Tax Pearson Corr. .010 -,115** -.058 .021 .025 .004 .020 -.061 1 .012 -.010 ,079* 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
ROI Pearson Corr. .039 -,314** -,254** -.024 .031 .032 -.025 -,259** .012 1 -,101** -,639** 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Total_Risk Pearson Corr. ,168** ,130** .048 -,090* .019 -.037 -.034 ,193** -.010 -,101** 1 .012 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Investment Pearson Corr. -.007 .022 ,127** -.002 -.012 -.064 ,088* ,138** ,079* -,639** .012 1 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Appendix 4. Pearson Correlation Matrix (Bivariate Analysis) 
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Appendix 5. Hausman Test and Lagrangian Multiplier Test 
 
• Hausman Test 
 
This a statistical hypothesis test in econometrics, which aims to choose between fixed 
and random effect model, considering that evaluates the consistency of an estimator when 
compared to an alternative, less efficient estimator which is already known to be 
consistent. (Hausman, 1978) 
𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)
′
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸) ~ 𝜒𝑘
2 
?̂?𝑭𝑬 - vector of estimators of the model with fixed effects; 
?̂?𝑹𝑬 - vector of estimators of the model with random effects; 
?̂?𝑭𝑬 - matrix of variances-covariance of the estimator ?̂?𝐹𝐸; 
?̂?𝑹𝑬 - matrix of variances-covariance of the estimator ?̂?𝑅𝐸; 
K -  number of regression coefficients. 
 
The null-hypothesis states that the coefficients estimated by the random effects 
estimator are adequate. Failing to accept the null hypothesis (if  𝐻 > 𝜒𝑘
2 or p-value < 
0.05) implies that there’s correlation between the individual unobservable effects and 
independent variables, which means that the fixed effects estimator is more reliable. 
 
• Lagrangian Multiplier Test 
 
Test for Var(ui) = 0, that is, the null hypothesis states that there’s no serial correlation, 
and so Pooled OLS estimator is consistent: 
 
If Ti=T for all i, the Lagrange-multiplier test statistic (Breusch-Pagan, 1980) is: 
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Therefore, if p-value>0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and the Pooled OLS 
estimation method, must be used. Otherwise, we should choose the Random Effects 
estimator. 
, , ,( ) ( ) ( )it is i it i is it isCov Cov u e u e Cov e e     
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Appendix 6. Firms composing the sample  
 
1.  AGRIDISTRIBUIÇÃO 
2.  ALEXANDRE BARBOSA BORGES 
3.  ALTRI 
4.  AMORIM CORK COMPOSITES 
5.  ANA-Aeroportos de Portugal 
6.  
APDL- ADMINISTRAÇÃO DOS PORTOS DO DOURO, LEIXÕES E VIANA DO 
CASTELO 
7.  BARRAQUEIRO TRANSPORTES 
8.  BOLAMA - SUPERMERCADOS 
9.  C.SANTOS - VEÍCULOS E PEÇAS 
10.  CABELTE-CABOS ELECTRICOS E TELEFONICOS 
11.  CAM - CAMIÕES AUTOMÓVEIS E MOTORES 
12.  CAMPOAVES - AVES DO CAMPO 
13.  CARNES VALINHO 
14.  CEREALIS - SGPS, S.A. 
15.  CIN - CORPORAÇÃO INDUSTRIAL DO NORTE 
16.  CIVIPARTS - COMÉRCIO DE PEÇAS E EQUIPAMENTOS 
17.  CME - CONSTRUÇÃO E MANUTENÇÃO ELECTROMECÂNICA 
18.  CMP - CIMENTOS MACEIRA E PATAIAS 
19.  COFINA 
20.  COLQUIMICA - INDÚSTRIA NACIONAL DE COLAS 
21.  Conduril 
22.  CONSTANTINO FERNANDES OLIVEIRA & FILHOS 
23.  CUF - QUÍMICOS INDSTRIAIS 
24.  EDP Energias de Portugal 
25.  EMEF - EMPRESA DE MANUTENÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTO FERROVIÁRIO 
26.  EMPIFARMA - PRODUTOS FARMACÊUTICOS 
27.  ESEGUR - EMPRESA DE SEGURANÇA 
28.  ESTORIL SOL (III) - TURISMO ANIMAÇÃO E JOGO 
29.  EXPORPLAS - INDÚSTRIA DE EXPORTAÇÃO DE PLÁSTICOS 
30.  FABRICA DE TABACO MICAELENSE 
31.  GALP 
32.  GERTAL - COMPANHIA GERAL DE RESTAURANTES E ALIMENTAÇÃO 
33.  GLINTT 
34.  Ibersol 
35.  IMPRESA 
36.  INAPA PORTUGAL - DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE PAPEL 
37.  INPLAS - INDÚSTRIAS DE PLÁSTICOS 
38.  INSCO - INSULAR DE HIPERMERCADOS 
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39.  INTRAPLÁS - INDÚSTRIA TRANSFORMADORA DE PLÁSTICOS 
40.  ITALAGRO - INDÚSTRIA DE TRANSFORMAÇÃO DE PRODUTOS ALIMENTARES 
41.  J PINTO LEITÃO 
42.  JEFAR - INDÚSTRIA DE CALÇADO 
43.  Jerónimo Martins 
44.  LABORATÓRIO MEDINFAR - PRODUTOS FARMACÊUTICOS 
45.  LAMEIRINHO - INDÚSTRIA TEXTIL 
46.  LITOCAR - DISTRIBUIÇÃO AUTOMÓVEL 
47.  LOJA DO GATO PRETO - ARTESANATO DE DECORAÇÃO 
48.  MAKRO - CASH & CARRY PORTUGAL, S.A. 
49.  MARTIFER  
50.  Media Capital 
51.  METALCERTIMA - INDÚSTRIA METALOMECÂNICA 
52.  Mota-Engil 
53.  NOVABASE 
54.  OGMA - INDÚSTRIA AERONÁUTICA DE PORTUGAL 
55.  PASCOAL & FILHOS 
56.  PESTANA GROUP 
57.  PIEDADE 
58.  POLITEJO - INDÚSTRIA DE PLÁSTICOS 
59.  PORMINHO ALIMENTAÇÃO 
60.  PORTUCEL 
61.  PROLACTO - LACTICINIOS DE S. MIGUEL 
62.  PROPEL 
63.  REDITUS BUSINESS SOLUTIONS 
64.  REFRIGE - SOCIEDADE INDUSTRIAL DE REFRIGERANTES 
65.  RIBERALVES - COMÉRCIO E INDÚSTRIA DE PRODUTOS ALIMENTARES 
66.  SATA INTERNACIONAL - AZORES AIRLINES 
67.  SEMAPA 
68.  SOARES DA COSTA 
69.  SOGRAPE 
70.  SOLIFERIAS - OPERADORES TURISTICOS 
71.  SOMAGUE - ENGENHARIA 
72.  SONAE 
73.  SUMOL + COMPAL MARCAS 
74.  TEGOPI - INDÚSTRIA METALOMECÂNICA 
75.  Teixeira Duarte 
76.  TOYOTA Salvador CAETANO 
77.  TRANSINSULAR - TRANSPORTES MARITIMOS INSULARES 
78.  TRECAR - TECIDOS E REVESTIMENTOS 
 
 
 
44 
 
79.  VESAUTO - AUTOMÓVEIS E REPARAÇÕES 
80.  VIAGENS ABREU 
 
